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COMMENT
Forced Cesarean Sections: Do the Ends Justify the Means?
So many emotional issues surround court-ordered cesarean see-
tions-pregnancy, motherhood, children, medical technology, bodily in-
tegrity, life, death, and impairment-that it is no wonder the practice has
engendered so much debate and legal commentary. The subject arises in
the rare situation when the attending physician decides that a surgical
intervention such as a cesarean section is necessary, the woman refuses to
consent, and the physician seeks a court order allowing the procedure
despite her refusal.1 A study published in the New England Journal of
Medicine in 19872 found that fifteen court orders authorizing cesarean
sections were sought in eleven states between 1980 and 1985.1 Since that
study was completed there have been other cases.4
Cesarean sections are relatively common and safe operations. The
number of cesareans done in the United States has risen throughout this
century as techniques have developed both for performing the surgery
and for monitoring the fetus in utero.5 Nevertheless, the risk of maternal
morbidity is four times greater with cesarean sections than it is with vagi-
nal deliveries.6 There are a number of reasons why a physician might
1. This patient-physician conflict typically arises during labor, but may surface earlier.
See, eg., infra text accompanying note 107. The reasons why a physician might decide a
cesarean is more appropriate than vaginal delivery are varied. See infra notes 7-10 and ac-
companying text.
2. Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1192 (1987) [hereinafter New England Journal of Medicine Study]. The researchers
sent a questionnaire to 90 directors of maternal-fetal fellowship programs and directors of
maternal-fetal medicine in obstetrics/gynecology residencies; the physicians represented 45
states and the District of Columbia (Alaska, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming
were not represented). The study asked the physicians to report incidents they knew of in
which doctors had sought a court order to perform a cesarean section, an intrauterine transfu-
sion, or a forced detention. Id. at 1192-93.
3. Id. at 1193.
4. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); In re Madyun, Misc. No.
189-86 (D.C. July 26, 1986), reprinted in A.C., 573 A.2d at 1260-63.
5. Janean A. Daniels, National Health Law Program, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1064,
1064 (1988); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951, 1958 (1986) (noting increase from 5% of deliv-
eries in 1970 to 16.5% in 1980); see also NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH REPORT OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CON-
FERENCE 6 (1981) (Pub. No. 82-2067) [hereinafter CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH REPORT] (offering
statistical analysis of use and risks of cesarean section births).
6. Daniels, supra note 5, at 1069 (citing CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH REPORT, supra note 5,
at 255).
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decide a cesarean is necessary. The cases reported in the New England
Journal of Medicine study provide a sample: the cesarean was indicated
because of fetal distress7' in seven of the fifteen; previous cesarean 8 in
three; and placenta previa9 in two.10 While most women consent to the
surgery their physician recommends, some women refuse."1 Two rea-
sons often given for the woman's refusal to consent are religious beliefs"
and concern for her own health.13 Out of fear of future liability14 or a
belief that the woman has made a wrong, or even immoral, decision,' 5
some hospitals will not accept the refusal and instead take the case to
court.
The position of the judge called upon to hear such a case is an
unenviable one. Most judges spend their time concerned with issues
other than the state of fetal monitoring technology. There may not be
time to give notice to all interested parties16 or for other procedures that
would enhance the court's decisionmaking ability.1 7 Most important, the
7. Fetal distress occurs when the fetal heart rate pattern is not synchronized with the
uterine contraction pattern, possibly indicating oxygen deprivation. Rhoden, supra note 5, at
1957.
8. A previous cesarean was once an automatic justification for a cesarean section in all
subsequent pregnancies due to the risk of rupture. Rupture now, however, occurs in less than
one percent of cases. One study showed no maternal death from rupture over a 32-year period.
Daniels, supra note 5, at 1069 (citing CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH REPORT, supra note 5, at 360).
9. Placenta previa occurs when the placenta has moved to block fetal access to the birth
canal. The coverage can be partial or complete. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1206
(25th ed. 1990).
10. New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1193. Another term that
may be used is "cephalopelvic disproportion," a general classification described as "a catch-
all" and as "vague and nondiagnostic." Daniels, supra note 5, at 1070. Cephalopelvic dispro-
portion refers to the size of the fetal head in relation to the maternal pelvis. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 278.
11. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1959.
12. See, e.g., In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. July 26, 1986), reprinted in In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1263 (D.C. 1990) (en bane); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp.
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 86, 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1981) (per curiam).
13. Watson A. Bowes, Jr. & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and
Legal Perspectives, 58 OB. & GYN. 209, 209 (1981) (discussing case of a Colorado woman who
feared surgery, in part because of her "morbid obesity").
14. Daniels, supra note 5, at 1064.
15. See, eg., Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 13, at 211.
16. A.C, 573 A.2d at 1248 & n.17 (finding that patient's longtime treating physician did
not receive notice of the court proceedings; would have testified against surgery). A. C. is the
case of a District of Columbia woman who was 26.5 weeks pregnant and dying from cancer.
The hospital doctor sought to perform a cesarean section because he felt that A.C.'s condition
had so deteriorated that she could not support the child. Id. at 1238-39. For a more thorough
discussion of A.C., see infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
17. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1248 & n.17 (finding that, in addition to her longtime physician not
being notified, patient's appointed attorney could not meet with her and her medical records
were missing); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal
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time constraints involved when a woman is in active labor make careful
study and reflection by the judge practically impossible: "In a matter of
hours or even minutes, a judge must decide whether to mandate major
surgery for a competent, unconsenting adult... or to uphold the wo-
man's refusal, with its potentially tragic consequences for her baby. " 18
As a result, precedent in this area is being established by orders handed
down without the benefit of the time and reflection usually considered
critical to the development of sound law.
It is impossible to slow labor in order to give a judge several weeks
to think about an appropriate order; it is critical, therefore, that advo-
cates present the arguments in advance. This Comment examines the
legal arguments for and against the authorization of cesarean sections
over the woman's refusal to consent and the ways that courts confronted
with the problem have addressed these issues. It then considers whether
court-ordered cesareans are good public policy. The Comment con-
cludes that the courts should hear these cases but should not override the
decision of a competent woman to forgo surgery her physician recom-
mends, even if the woman is pregnant at the time of refusal.
The courts decide cesarean section cases based on a balancing of the
interests involved. If no fundamental right is involved, then the court
must simply balance the various interests of the patient, the hospital, and
the state against each other. 9 If, however, the case involves a fundamen-
tal right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause,20 the court must undertake a much closer review of the state's
actions, subjecting them to strict scrutiny. Only if the state's interests
are compelling and the means for achieving its goals are narrowly tai-
lored to meet the desired ends will the state be permitted to infringe upon
a fundamental right.21 With cesarean sections, there is no less intrusive
technique that will meet the physician's concerns and therefore no more
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 9, 48-49 (1987) (citing lack of notice, adequate representa-
tion, explicit standards of proof, and rights to timely appeal).
18. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1952; see also A.C., 573 A.2d at 1238 (three-hour hearing);
New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1193 ("Once a court order was
deemed necessary, it took six or fewer hours to obtain it in 14 of 16 cases (88%). In three of
these cases (19%), the court orders were actually obtained in an hour or less; at least one order
was granted by telephone.").
19. For an example of a general weighing of interests, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
761-62 (1985) (Supreme Court weighed individual's interests in privacy against society's inter-
ests in obtaining evidence and in accurate determinations of guilt and innocence in deciding
the State could not surgically remove a bullet from defendant to use as evidence).
20. In order for this test to apply there must be not only a recognized fundamental right,
but also state action. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
21. See, ag., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 155 (1973).
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narrowly-tailored means. The balance thus focuses on the interests of
the woman and the state. Determining the weight of an interest is a
highly subjective undertaking. It is not, however, one a court must un-
dertake without guidance. A number of legal analogies are available to
help determine relative weight. Although none are exact, they are never-
theless helpful.
The logical starting point for examining a refusal to undergo surgery
is the doctrine of informed consent. Before a physician may embark on a
course of treatment, he must make his patient aware of the proposed
intervention, any risks associated with it, the possible outcomes, any rea-
sonable alternatives, and any future interventions that may become nec-
essary once a treatment plan is begun.22 It is then up to the patient to
decide whether she wishes to proceed with or refuse the proposed treat-
ment. By requiring the patient's informed consent, the law respects the
patient's autonomy and secures for the patient the right to make the risk-
benefit analysis inherent in medical decisionmaking.23
Informed consent has a strong basis in the common law, under
which any touching without consent constitutes a battery.24 Under
modern law, informed consent is codified in many states and the failure
to obtain it is considered negligence, rather than a battery.25 Once a
competent adult woman has decided to refuse medical treatment, the
critical question becomes whether the state ever has a right to override
her refusal, even if she is pregnant.26
22. Nancy M. King, Consent to Treatment, in HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW § 7.1.3, at
463-68 (Anne Dellinger ed. 1991).
23. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 17, 42-51
(1982); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1970.
24. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846; King, supra note 22, § 7.1, at 458.
25. Statutes differ from state to state. Most, however, define the standard of disclosure
and causation. King, supra note 22, § 7.3, at 480-81 (comparing informed consent statutes);
see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1990).
26. Although labor is a difficult process that may involve stress, anxiety, or pain, it is not
a process that renders a woman presumptively incompetent to make a decision. Nevertheless,
some commentators seem implicitly to argue that the pregnant woman should be treated as an
incompetent. See, e.g., Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections: A Judicial
Standard for Resolving the Conflict Between Fetal Interests and Maternal Rights, 10 J. LEGAL
MED. 211, 243 (1989) (citing the institutionalization and treatment against the will of the
mentally incompetent as an example of a time when the state has a right to intervene).
Competency determinations are formal assessments by a psychiatrist or mental health
professional, or, if absolutely necessary, by the treating physician. A competency evaluation
need not take much time, especially since a psychiatrist probably will be available in a hospital
without much delay. Competency evaluations already are undertaken by psychiatrists in a
number of situations, including medical decisionmaking. See generally RUTH R. FADER &
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 288-93 (1986)
(presenting and evaluating different approaches to assessing competency); RALPH REISNER &
300 [Vol. 70
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The court must therefore balance the woman's right to refuse
against any interests asserted by the state. Courts and commentators
have identified four state interests relevant to a competent decision to
refuse treatment: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of de-
pendent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the preserva-
tion of the ethical integrity of the medical profession."27 Neither
prevention of suicide nor the preservation of ethical integrity is relevant
when a woman refuses to consent to a cesarean section. Even if her
health is also at risk, the woman refusing a cesarean is not trying to com-
mit suicide,28 and medical ethics do not require a physician to force un-
wanted treatment on a patient.29 Thus, preservation of life and the
protection of third parties are the state interests truly at issue.
It is well established that the state's interest in preservation of life is
insufficient to justify overriding the refusal of a competent adult when
only that patient's life is at risk; even if the refusal of the proposed treat-
ment will result in death, the decision belongs to the patient.30 Some
courts have argued that the woman's health is also a factor to consider in
deciding whether to order a cesarean, if she would benefit from the inter-
vention.3" Such an analysis contravenes the right to refuse treatment,
even if the refusal would result in death. In the cesarean setting, how-
ever, there are not one, but two concerns at issue: the woman and the
fetus. Is the state's interest in the potential life of the fetus sufficient to
allow the court to override the decision of a competent pregnant adult?
Four bodies of law relate to this question: those controlling child
neglect, child treatment, rescue, and abortion. Child abuse and neglect
laws are often cited as a basis for state intervention.32 There are, how-
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 807-22 (1990) (same).
No competency evaluation was done in In re A.C., 573 A.2d. 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en bane), see
id. at 1247; see also New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1193 (comment-
ing that of 21 reported cases, the woman's competency was evaluated in only 3).
27. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1971; see also A.C., 573 A.2d at 1246 (identifying these four
interests); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (1977) (same); DAVID W. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DY-
ING § 10:12, at 248 (1981) (same); Noble-Algire, supra note 26, at 227 (same).
28. SeeA.C., 573 A.2d at 1246 n.12. But cf. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that failure to take steps to preserve life is suicide; state may forcibly intervene).
29. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1246 n.13; Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1971-72.
30. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972) (upholding patient's refusal on
religious grounds to consent to blood transfusion deemed necessary to save his life); Lane v.
Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 384-85, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (1978) (upholding patient's
refusal to have legs amputated to prevent spread of gangrene); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J.
Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (1978) (same).
31. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 86, 274
S.E.2d 457, 458 (1981) (per curiam).
32. See, e.g., id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 459; Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 13, at 212.
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ever, at least two problems with the argument that the State's recognized
authority to intervene in parents' actions that are abusive and neglectful
of their children justifies forcing unwilling women to undergo cesarean
sections. First, many states have statutes setting forth standards and
procedures for court intervention and assumption of custody or control
of minors.33 It is not at all clear that fetuses are meant to be included
within the definition of juveniles in these statutes.34 Nevertheless, courts
have been willing to exercise jurisdiction over fetuses using these laws.
For example, in Jefferson v. Griffln Spalding County Hospital Authority 35
the hospital sought a court order to operate on a woman with a complete
placenta previa who refused to consent to surgery. 36  The Georgia De-
partment of Human Resources intervened, seeking not only the court
order, but also temporary custody of the fetus as a child without proper
parental care.37 The trial court granted custody of the fetus to the De-
partment and gave it "full authority to make all decisions, including giv-
ing consent to the surgical delivery."' 38  This order was upheld on appeal
per curiam, although one concurring opinion questioned the assumption
of jurisdiction by the juvenile court3 9 and another seemed to rest on the
general balancing test between the rights of the woman and fetus, not on
the court's ability to award custody.40
A second inadequacy of relying on child abuse and neglect laws is
the implicit equation of refusing medical treatment with abuse. A wo-
man should not be considered a negligent or abusive parent solely be-
cause she refuses to consent to treatment she does not consider
appropriate.
Closely related to the questions of abuse and neglect and to statu-
tory child neglect law is the body of law authorizing the court to inter-
vene and order medical treatment for children over their parents'
objections. Many religious persons, such as Christian Scientists and Je-
hovah's Witnesses, do not believe in accepting certain medical treat-
33. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(20) (Supp. 1990) (defining juvenile as a person
under 18). In defining over whom ajuvenile court may assume jurisdiction over and for whom
it may make decisions about custody or medical treatment, many states rely on a similar age-
based formula. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1(3), (18) (Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
11-5 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199-011 (1991).
34. Daniels, supra note 5, at 1066; see also Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1963 (contending that
the jurisdiction argument cannot be relied on because it is too "narrow and legalistic").
35. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
36. Id. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
37. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
38. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
39. Id. at 92, 274 S.E.2d at 461-62 (Smith, 3., concurring).
40. Id. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460 (Hill, J., concurring).
[Vol. 70
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ment.41 The parents' right to refuse treatment in exercise of their
religion, however, is insufficient to prevent the state's intervention to or-
der treatment for their children. 2 It should be clear, though, that court-
ordered treatment for a child and a forced cesarean are not comparable.
The parent who refuses treatment for the child in the usual situation has
no interest in physical integrity at stake. As there is no personal risk
involved, there is no interest analogous to the pregnant woman's interest
in not undergoing surgery without her consent.
Commentators often cite Prince v. Massachusetts43 in support of
state intervention: "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves.
But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children."44 Prince, however, was not a case involving
any risk to the parent; in fact it is not even a case about health care.
Rather, it involved an appeal from the conviction of an eight-year-old
girl for selling The Watchtower, a publication of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
in violation of laws restricting selling by children. The girl's aunt, her
guardian, had given her the magazines and argued that the conviction
violated the girl's First Amendment right to freedom of religion a.4  The
aunt could assert no interest similar to bodily integrity. Because balanc-
ing tests are only analogous when the rights in both cases are roughly
equal, Prince has little to add to the forced cesarean debate.'
Professor Nancy Rhoden has provided a twist on an example that
illustrates this critical difference. The example is that of Dr. Norman
Fost: "'[I]f a father were denying medical care to his child and also
blocking access to him... one would be justified in pushing the father
aside to treat the child.' "In Few people would disagree with this state-
41. Jehovah's Witnesses refuse to accept blood transfusions because they believe doing so
violates Biblical prohibitions against blood consumption. RELIGIONS OF AMERICA: FER-
MENT AND FAITH IN AN AGE OF CRISIS 139 (Leo C. Rosten ed. 1975); see also Leviticus 17:10
("If any man ... eats any blood, I will set my face against that person who eats blood, and will
cut him off from among his people."); Acts 15:20 (abstain... from blood").
42. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1267-68 & n.99
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing court's ability to order treatment not only when the child's life is
threatened, but also in cases in which refusal to treat can result in significant impairment);
Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1960-61 (same).
43. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
44. Id. at 170; see also Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 236 (citing Prince).
45. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159-61.
46. In a later case, the Supreme Court relied on Prince to uphold a lower court decision
authorizing blood transfusions for minor Jehovah's Witnesses whose parents objected. Jeho-
vah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam), aff'g 278 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
47. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1967 & n.105 (quoting Dr. Norman Fost, Address at the
Hastings Center Conference on Abortion and Scientific Change at Hastings-on-Hudson, New
York (May 24, 1985)).
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ment, but it is not fully relevant to what is at issue with forced cesareans.
As Professor Rhoden points out: "A more accurate analogy would be if
the recalcitrant father were very obese and securely wedged in the door,
and gaining access to the sick child to provide treatment required cutting
through the father."4 While this example may seem unlikely to occur in
real life, it does point out the critical part of the balance left out in Dr.
Fost's example.
Another body of law relevant to the balance of interests in the
cesarean setting is that of rescue. Generally stated, no one is required to
go to the aid of another absent a special relationship, such as that be-
tween parent and child.49 Even when a special relationship, and there-
fore a duty to aid, exists, there is no duty if the rescuer would risk her
personal safety in the process.50 That a potential rescuer has no legal
duty does not mean she has no moral duty, nor does it mean that society
cannot expect parents to undergo personal risk to help their children. It
means only that the courts will not intervene and require the parent to
provide the health-risking assistance. 5 1
Organ donations by a living donor offer an apt analogy. The living
donor receives no physical benefit, only the psychological benefit of hay-
48. Id. at 1968.
49. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1976;
Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue:. A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 423,
425 (1985).
50. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 15-10, at 1354; Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1977.
51. One commentator points out that there is a common-law cause of action when one
prevents others from providing assistance. Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 235. She argues
that the woman is standing in the way of aid for the fetus and is therefore liable. Id. This
analysis suffers from the same error as the analogy to denial of treatment for children: it does
not take into account the serious invasion of the woman's body and her interest in not under-
going it against her will.
A related "interest" that courts have occasionally used to justify forcing treatment on a
competent, refusing adult is the presence of minor children. Because there is a societal interest
in having children provided for, the argument goes, the parent should not be able to refuse
treatment if she has dependents. See, eg., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 753-54
(D. Conn. 1965) (authorizing blood transfusions when patient had four young children). But
cf. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 349, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987) (holding that the right of compe-
tent, terminally ill wife to withdraw life-sustaining respirator outweighed state's interest in
preserving life). Even when the patient is allowed to make her own decision, however, courts
may have considered the dependent party factor. See Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So. 2d
679, 687-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing competent adult to refuse blood transfusions
on basis of religious beliefs when refusal would not result in abandonment of her children).
This interest seems little more than a rationalization because reference to either rescue law or
the right of a competent patient to refuse medical treatment even if the refusal will result in
death are in direct contradiction. Moreover, as Professor Rhoden points out, the State does
not prevent parents with young children from engaging in other activities that may leave their
children orphans, from skydiving to serving in the United States Army. Rhoden, supra note 5,
at 1974-75.
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ing helped preserve the life of another, and, as in the cesarean setting,
major surgery is required. 2 The courts do not order a refusing adult to
submit to organ donation for the benefit of another.5 3 McFall v. Shimp 54
provides a classic example. In McFall the patient's cousin, the only suit-
able donor, 5 refused to undergo a bone marrow transplant operation.
The court declined to order him to do so, even though without the trans-
plant the patient would die.5 6 When a court orders a cesarean section, it
requires the woman to rescue the fetus at her own risk, a decision un-
precedented in other areas of law.
The organ donation analogy is appropriate only if the state's interest
is similar to that involved in the forced cesarean situation. Fetal rights
advocates argue that the fetus has a number of rights recognized at law
that must be added into the balance. A cause of action for wrongful
injury in utero, and the inheritance right of a fetus born alive after the
testator's death, for example, are cited as evidence of legal recognition of
fetal rights.5 7 In addition, these advocates point to Roe v. Wade58 as
having established that the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
is compelling, and is strong enough to override the woman's refusal to
submit to treatment:
[w]ith respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability .... If the
52. Blood transfusions are not an adequate comparison with "the much more invasive,
risky, and painful cesarean sections and intrauterine procedures at issue today." New England
Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1195. For this reason, Raleigh Fitken-Paul Mor-
gan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423-24, 201 A.2d 537, 538, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
985 (1964), in which a court ordered a blood transfusion over the objections of a 32-week-
pregnant Jehovah's Witness, is not particularly helpful in the forced cesarean setting. Never-
theless, this case occasionally is cited as support of a court's power to order a cesarean section.
See, e-g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 89, 274 S.E.2d 457,
460 (1981); Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 13, at 212.
53. In Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969), the court applied substituted judg-
ment and allowed a guardian to consent to the donation of an incompetent patient's kidney for
the benefit of his brother. Id. at 148-49. This case clearly is not the same as a court-ordered
donation by a competent patient over his nonconsent. See also In re Guardianship of Pescin-
ski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 7-8, 226 N.W.2d 180, 181-82 (1975) (court refused to follow Strunk and
instead applied the "best interests" test and refused to allow a guardian to consent to a kidney
transplant). In applying the substituted judgment test, a court will try to determine what the
patient would decide for herself if competent. In applying the best interests test, the court
focuses solely on what is best for the patient.
54. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
55. Id. at 90.
56. Id. at 91-92 ("For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its
teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for
another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence.").
57. Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 217-19.
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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state is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother.5 9
Roe does not, however, support the proposition that the state has a suffi-
cient interest in fetal life to justify overriding the woman's refusal to con-
sent to major surgery. A state interest once found sufficient to override
another interest does not thereby become a talisman before which all in-
terests must fall.
In the abortion context, the United States Supreme Court weighed
the woman's right to privacy against the state's interest in potential life
and found that in the third trimester the State may regulate abortion,
even to the extent of prohibiting it in all cases in which the life or health
of the mother is not threatened.' But a critical difference separates the
level of intervention between regulation of abortion and authorization of
surgery, even if it is done to aid maternal health. 61 Finally, Roe itself
makes clear that a fetus is not treated as a person with full constitutional
rights.62
The Supreme Court also has held that maternal health may not be
risked to benefit fetal health. In Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians & Gynecologists63 the Court struck down a Pennsylvania stat-
ute that would have required a physician performing a post-viability
abortion to use the abortion technique "'that... would provide the best
opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted alive unless,' in the physi-
cian's good-faith judgment, that technique 'would present a significantly
greater medical risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman.' "64 The
Court found the statute unconstitutional because requiring such a
"trade-off" is impermissible. 65 Therefore, even if the State could argue
that it has a compelling interest in fetal life sufficient to require a woman
59. Id. at 163-64.
60. Id.
61. Daniels, supra note 5, at 1066; Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1965. One commentator has
suggested that paternal interests in the fetus should override the woman's refusal so long as her
right to have an abortion is not infringed upon. See Kevin M. Apollo, Note, The Biological
Father's Right to Require a Pregnant Woman to Undergo Medical Treatment Necessary to Sus-
tain FetalLife, 94 DICK. L. REV. 199, 214, 219, 224 (1989). This discussion barely addresses,
however, the woman's significant interest in autonomy and bodily integrity, and cannot be
considered a proper balancing of the interests involved.
62. "[T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn." Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
63. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
64. Id. at 768.
65. Id.; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979) (striking down an earlier
version of the Pennsylvania statute on similar grounds).
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to undergo major surgery against her will (and it seems reasonably cer-
tain that it does not), the State still would be unable to require the wo-
man to undergo the increased risks of surgical delivery because it is
impermissible to trade away her health to benefit the fetus.
Trial and appellate level courts have considered some, or all, of
these doctrines when deciding whether to authorize a cesarean. The two
appellate courts that have considered the issue, however, have come to
very different conclusions. In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospi-
tal Authority66 the trial court cited Roe for the proposition that "[a] via-
ble unborn child has the right under the U.S. Constitution to the
protection of the State."'6 The trial court issued an order giving the
Georgia Department of Human Resources custody of the fetus and the
ability to consent to a forced cesarean for the woman: "Because the life
of the defendant and of the unborn child are, at the moment, inseparable
*.. it [is] appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the
extent it is necessary to give the child an opportunity to live."' 68  The
trial court spoke only of the "wishes" of the woman, not of her informed
consent. It did not consider her competency, nor did it address rescue
law. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the trial court's order per
curiam, and therefore accepted the trial court's balancing of the woman's
religious rights, the risk of surgery, and the child's right to live, as well as
the trial court's finding that the interests of the fetus were sufficient to
override the woman's refusal to consent.69
A recent District of Columbia Court of Appeals case, In re A. C.,10 is
perhaps the most publicized of the forced cesarean cases. A.C. had can-
cer years before the case arose. While her cancer was in remission, she
married and became pregnant. During the course of her pregnancy, her
cancer reappeared.7 1 A.C. and her physicians discussed whether the
physicians should attempt a cesarean section at twenty-eight weeks if she
became too ill to carry the baby to term. A.C. consented to this sur-
gery.72 Unfortunately, the physicians decided that a cesarean was neces-
sary at 26.5 weeks, an eventuality A.C. and her physicians had not
discussed. The hospital sought a court order advising it what to do.7 3
66. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). For further discussion of Jefferson, see supra text
accompanying notes 35-40.
67. Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
68. Id.; see discussion of child abuse law, supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
69. Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460 (Hill, J., concurring).
70. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
71. Id. at 1238.
72. Id. at 1238-39.
73. Id. at 1238.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The court appointed counsel for the fetus and for A.C.; the District of
Columbia intervened on behalf of the fetus, asserting standing as parens
patriae.74 The judge held a three-hour hearing at the hospital, but not in
A.C.'s room.75 During the hearing, a doctor twice tried to ascertain
A.C.'s position on the surgery. At first she consented, but the second
time she refused, mouthing the words "I don't want it done.",76 The
judge found that her intentions were unclear and ordered the cesarean."
A stay was denied and the surgery was performed. The baby died in two
and a half hours; A.C. died two days later.78
Even though the surgery had been performed and A.C. had died,
the court of appeals agreed to hear the case because of the need for gui-
dance in this area and because the situation was susceptible to repetition
without possibility for review.79 The court's analysis is the first involving
a detailed balancing test that takes into account many of the legal doc-
trines discussed in this Comment. The court began with informed con-
sent and the proposition that a competent adult can refuse treatment.
Therefore, it stated, A.C.'s competency to decide should have been as-
sessed. 80 The court then examined the four state interests that might
override a competent refusal to undergo treatment.8' It was irrelevant
that A.C. was terminally ill: "the right of bodily integrity is not extin-
guished simply because someone is ill, or even at death's door."82 The
court found that only the state's interests in the preservation of life and
the protection of third parties were relevant.8" It then examined whether
either was sufficiently compelling to override A.C.'s refusal and con-
cluded that neither was, pointing in part to the law of rescue.8 4
The court set forth a method for deciding requests for authorization
to perform emergency cesareans. The first step is an inquiry into the
74. Id. at 1239.
75. Id. at 1238.
76. Id. at 1240-41.
77. Id. at 1241.
78. Id. at 1238.
79. Id. at 1241-42. In addition, representatives of A.C.'s estate filed suit against the hos-
pital; therefore, there were collateral consequences. Id.
80. Id. at 1247. For further discussion of competency evaluations, see supra note 26,
81. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1246. The four state interests are listed supra in the text accompa-
nying note 27.
82. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1247. One commentator reports that the attorney appointed for the
fetus had argued that "Ms. C had no important interests in this decision because she was
dying: 'unintended consequences on the mother' are 'insignificant in respect to the mother's
very short life expectancy."' Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 212 n.3 (quoting George A.
Annas, She's Going to Die: The Case of Angela C., 18 HASINGS CENTER REP. 23, 24 (1988)).
83. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1246 & nn.12-13.
84. Id. at 1244, 1252.
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patient's competence to decide.8 5 If, on the one hand, a patient is found
competent, her decision controls in virtually all situations. The court,
however, did not foreclose the possibility that a situation might arise in
which overriding that decision nevertheless would be appropriate: "[W]e
anticipate that such cases will be extremely rare and truly exceptional.
This is not such a case."86 If, on the other hand, the patient is incompe-
tent, the court held that a substituted judgment analysis must be under-
taken. Among the factors to be considered are prior statements by the
patient (here, for example, A.C.'s consent to surgery at twenty-eight
weeks as well as her consent to a palliative treatment that eased her pain
considerably, but increased the risk to the fetus) and a general inquiry
into her values, with assistance from her family and physicians, if appro-
priate. If the court's inquiry does not reveal enough information to make
a substituted judgment, other women's actions in a similar situation are
relevant.87
Judge Belson concurred in part and dissented in part. He disagreed
with the majority that a case in which a woman's decision could be over-
ridden would be so rare an event.88 A competent decision should indeed
be given great weight, and other factors, such as the mother's health or
religious beliefs, should be considered; 9 so should the likelihood of the
fetus' survival and its right to be born without impairment.90 Judge
Belson argued that the organ-donation analogy was inappropriate be-
cause "a woman who carries a child to viability is in fact a member of a
unique category of persons.... [T]he expectant mother has placed her-
self in a special class of persons who are bringing another person into
existence."91  Because the pregnant woman's situation and the depen-
dency of her fetus are unique, her decision should be easier to override
than the majority opinion would suggest.92
Jefferson and A. C. reveal something of how the balancing test has
been played out in practice. A new interest has been added to the bal-
ance since each of these cases was decided, however, and it remains to be
seen how the courts will address it. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health9" the United States Supreme Court explicitly recog-
85. Id. at 1247.
86. Id. at 1252.
87. Id. at 1250-51.
88. Id. at 1256-57 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 1257-58 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 1258 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 1256 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 1256-57 (Belson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
93. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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nized a constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity: "The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall 'deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' This principle
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions."94
This right is not an absolute one. It is only implicated if the state is
an actor.95 The doctrine of state action is a confusing one.96 In constitu-
tional cases there often is a state statute which authorizes the challenged
conduct or standard; a state statute is clearly state action.97 With court-
ordered cesareans, however, no statute is involved. Nevertheless, one
usually can find state action, most likely in the court order itself, since
without the court order the physician's disregard of a competent wo-
man's refusal would constitute a battery. 98 State action can exist in a
94. Id. at 2851 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). In support of this right, the
Court cited a number of cases. See, eg., Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1041 (1990)
(holding that the "forcible injection of medication," even into a criminally insane patient, is "a
substantial interference" with that person's liberty); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980)
(transfer to hospital and forced course of treatment affect liberty interests); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (holding that children as well as adults have a liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted treatment); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (balanc-
ing individual's interest in bodily integrity against the state's interest in preventing smallpox
and requiring individual to have vaccination).
In Harper, the Court held that the state's procedures for review of medical decisions were
sufficient and allowed Harper to be treated against his will. In the prison setting, however, the
standard of review is whether the treatment is reasonably related to legitimate penological
goals. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1037. This less stringent standard explains in part how the Court
could allow the nonconsensual treatment in this case but cite it as support for a constitutional
right to bodily integrity in the same term.
TheA. C court did argue for a constitutional right to bodily integrity, pointing to some of
the same cases cited by the Court in Cruzan. See A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244-45. The court did
not undertake a constitutional analysis, however, because there was no statutory provision
involved. Id. at 1247 n.14. Presumably, the court therefore felt there was no state action
involved. For an argument that state action is involved, however, see infra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text.
There is a great deal more involved in the Cruzan decision than can reasonably be ad-
dressed in this Comment. For an excellent discussion of that case and its effect on the right to
die, see Jennifer E.B. Overton, Note, Unanswered Implications-The Clouded Rights of the
Incompetent Patient Under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 69 N.C. L.
REv. 1293 (1991).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 18-1, at 1690.
97. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-19 (1973) (involving Texas statutes prohibit-
ing the procurement of, attempt at, or performance of an abortion except to save the life of the
mother).
98. One can also argue that there is state action because so many hospitals receive federal
funding through Medicaid and Medicare. A great many women on whom forced cesareans are
performed receive public assistance. See infra text accompanying note 125. It is important,
however, that women in private hospitals or women who do not receive public aid also be
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rule allocating decisions between a private actor and the government.99
A court's holding that it can allocate the decision whether to proceed
with surgery to a hospital rather than to the woman arguably is an exam-
ple of state action."oo
Even without state action, the constitutional recognition of the im-
portance of bodily integrity weighs heavily in the balance. When only
the informed consent doctrine weighed on the side of the woman, preser-
vation of life and the interest of third parties, as seen through rescue law,
were arguably insufficient to outweigh the patient's interest in making
her own assessment of the risks and benefits of surgical intervention and,
ultimately, in making her own decision. Certainly, then, the state's inter-
ests are insufficient to outweigh an interest grounded in the Constitution.
The argument that the state has a compelling interest in fetal life is not
adequately supported to uphold overriding the woman's decision.
Both the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses bear on whether a court can order surgery despite a wo-
man's refusal, particularly considering the Supreme Court's recognition
that procreation is a fundamental interest, the attempted infringement of
which is subject to strict scrutiny.10 1 Rescue doctrine is an important
part of assessing equal protection, just as it is in considering whether the
State can override a woman's refusal to consent to surgery. Assuming
that the requirement of state action can be met, the question is whether
pregnant women can be treated differently from others. Other adults are
not legally required to do anything to rescue someone. Parents are not
required to risk their health and safety, as through an organ transplant,
to benefit their child, or even to save the child's life.1"2 Are pregnant
women a unique group, as Judge Belson argues,"0 3 or are they simply a
subgroup of parents?"° A distinction based on pregnancy may not be
protected. Therefore, it is much more satisfying to find state action in the intervention of the
judge to remove the decision from the woman and make it the State's.
99. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 18-5, at 1707.
100. See, eg., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488,497-98 (W.D.
Wash. 1967) (holding that doctors authorized to give blood transfusions to minor pursuant to
a court order acted under state authority).
101. "[N] or shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court first recognized that procreation is
a fundamental interest in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Strict scrutiny analysis is similar, but not identical to, the due process analysis described above,
see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text, in that the State's ends must be compelling and
its means narrowly tailored to meet those ends.
102. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
103. See supra text accompanying note 91.
104. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1988-89. Professor Rhoden points out that one could require
all parents to be "'Splendid Samaritans!" and provide organs when necessary. Id. She also
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illegitimate because the biology of pregnancy is different.10 5 Although
this is undoubtedly true, the relationship between child and parent is not
limited to the pregnancy setting. A requirement made of pregnant wo-
men but not of other parents therefore may violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
The arguments for and against allowing court orders are many and
complex. Considering all these points of view, the balancing test should
support the woman's right to decide whether to consent to surgery. In
other words, none of the asserted state interests is sufficient to override
the woman's informed consent. The majority of judges who have heard
these cases, however, have disagreed. 06 Although it is important to ex-
amine the various legal doctrines at issue in these cases it is more impor-
tant to realize that these doctrines can change. The far more significant,
and difficult, question is whether we as a society will choose to allow
courts to override a woman's decision to forego recommended surgical
intervention.
Behind the veil of legal niceties lies a tableau of disturbing violence.
One example clearly illustrates the harm to dignity, both the patient's
and the medical profession's, that can result from forced cesarean sec-
tions. In 1984 a Nigerian woman was admitted to a Chicago hospital,
pregnant with triplets. Her physician strongly recommended a cesarean,
but she and her husband consistently refused. The hospital proceeded to
obtain a court order without informing the parents.
"Confronted with the doctor's intentions, the woman and her
husband became irate. The husband was asked to leave, re-
fused, and was forcedly removed from the hospital by seven
security officers. The woman became combative and was
placed in full leathers, a term that refers to leather wrist and
ankle cuffs that are attached to the four corners of a bed to
prevent the patient from moving. Despite her restraints, the
woman continued to scream for help and bit through her intra-
venous tubing in an attempt to get free.' 10 7
argues, however, that because the organ donation situation would arise so rarely, this route
only points out the equal protection problem with requiring women to agree to surgery. Id.
105. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974) (holding that refusal to
cover pregnancy under state insurance plan does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
106. See, e.g., New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1193 (Of 15 orders
sought for cesarean sections all were granted except one. The orders were sought in Colorado,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Texas; the Maine court refused to issue the order.).
107. Gallagher, supra note 17, at 9-10 (quoting Veronica E.B. Kolder, Women's Health
Law: A Feminist Perspective 2 (August 1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Harvard Women's Law Journal)).
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While this case is extreme, it is not isolated. At least one court has
authorized the police to bring a woman to the hospital if she does not
report there on her own.010 All this discussion, of course, leaves aside
the violence inherent in anesthetizing and operating on an unconsenting
patient, even one who reduces her protests in the face of a court order."°9
One of the most dangerous aspects of court intervention in these
situations is that it hides the violence. The court is protected from the
violent aftershocks of its decision because it is not present when the wo-
man undergoes surgery. The doctor is authorized by the court to take
action and therefore is also able to shield himself from the violent conse-
quences. 110 While both the court and the doctor may console themselves
that in the end the action taken was for the best, this may not be the case.
Whether something is for the best depends ultimately on more than
just the biological outcome. A number of sociological implications flow
from allowing forced surgeries. Tragedy happens, unfortunately, often
through the fault of no one, but it may be that greater harm can result
from efforts to prevent tragedy. Court intervention to prevent tragedy
may have tragic consequences itself: "[C]ourts have long recognized the
wisdom of acting as though persons could never be used as a means to the
ends of others, knowing that any clear departure from that ideal could
spell the beginning of a disastrous slide." ' In other words: "It is tragic
that persons are harmed, but it is wrong that you harm them."'1 2
Three issues lurk beneath the forced cesarean debate, each of which
is worth closer consideration. First, there is the question whether women
should be regulated throughout pregnancy. Commentators, notably Pro-
fessor John Robertson, have argued that once a woman becomes preg-
nant and decides to forego her right to an abortion, she has assumed an
obligation that limits her freedom of decision over her body and should
be required to submit to whatever treatment is best for the fetus, regard-
108. Id. at 47 (noting that in a 1982 Michigan case the trial court authorized the police to
pick up the woman and bring her to the hospital for whatever treatment physicians deemed
necessary if she did not appear there by a specified time).
109. Some women do stop protesting in the face of a court order. See, eg., Bowes &
Selgestad, supra note 13, at 211 ("The directive of the court was clear that necessary medical
treatment could be administered against the will of the patient. Fortunately, the court's order
had a salutary effect on the patient, and her attitude became one of reluctant acceptance and
compliance.").
110. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 2004; see also In re A.C. 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990)
(en banc) (pointing out the violence involved and that allowing the surgery "would surely give
one pause in a civilized society, especially when A.C. had done no wrong").
111. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 15-9, at 1335.
112. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 2002.
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less of whether it involves forcible bodily intrusion.1 13 While "[t]he state
would, of course, be free to favor the woman's autonomy over the fetus'
well-being at any point in the pregnancy, if that choice were politically
acceptable," the presumption would be that "the woman loses the lib-
erty to act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus." '114 The State
therefore could regulate alcohol consumption or smoking."' It also
could impose criminal or civil liability for failure to undergo "safe and
effective" fetal therapy; unless the risk to the woman's health is undue,
she would have "no defense" because she waived her rights.' 16
Professor Robertson's theories are an extreme example of exactly
what forced cesareans represent: the removal of critical decisionmaking
about health and pregnancy from the woman to the State." 7 His theo-
ries are, however, indicative of a broader societal assumption that women
cannot be relied on to make decisions about their pregnancies. It has
become increasingly popular in recent years to speak of a maternal-fetal
conflict.' 18 Language of confrontation or disparity of interests is inap-
113. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437-38 (1983).
114. Id. at 437 & n.95; see also MEYERs, supra note 27, § 10:14, at 255-56 (arguing that the
State should be able to override' the woman's refusal to any treatment deemed necessary for a
live birth).
115. Robertson, supra note 113, at 442.
116. Id. at 444-45.
117. For other examples, see Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 335, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983)
(A husband sued his four-month-pregnant wife to force her to undergo a "purse string" opera-
tion which would reinforce her cervix and reduce the chance of miscarriage. The trial court
issued the order; the appellate court reversed.); New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra
note 2, at 1195 ("16-year-old pregnant girl in Wisconsin has been held in secure detention for
the sake of her fetus because she tended 'to be on the run' and to 'lack motivation or ability to
seek prenatal care' ") (citing Girl Detained to Protect Fetus, Wis. ST. J., Aug. 16, 1985, § 3, at
2).
118. See, eg., Charles-Edward Anderson, Mom vs Fetus, A.B.A. J., August, 1990, at 14;
Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 13, at 209; Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 213-15; Robertson,
supra note 113, at 437; Thomas L. Shriner, Maternal Versus Fetal Rights-A Clinical Di-
lemma, 53 OB. & GYN. 518, 518-19 (1979).
The idea that women are not reliable decisionmakers is not one which is limited to the
area of reproductive health. A recent study of 22 right to die decisions from appeals courts in
14 states has found that women "are consistently portrayed as less capable of rational decision
making than men." Courts, Wills and Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at A13. The recent
controversy surrounding the imposition of fetal-protection policies banning all women from
working in lead exposure jobs unless they can prove medical inability to have a child is another
area in which decisionmaking is being questioned. See U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 1196, 1207 (1991) (refusing to permit company to ban women from holding jobs in
which there is exposure to lead because the policy is not related to a business purpose). Judge
Easterbrook summed up the issue well in his dissent to the Seventh Circuit's decision in John-
son Controls: "No legal or ethical principle compels or allows Johnson to assume that women
are less able than men to make intelligent decisions about the welfare of the next generation."
U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 913 (7th Cir. 1989) (reargued en bane) (Eas-
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propriate in the context of pregnancy and motherhood. While there are
undoubtedly times when what the woman wants to do and what is best
for the fetus do not coincide, talk of conflict is not helpful in resolving
these situations.
Instead, it is far more appropriate to acknowledge the woman's role
a the logical decisionmaker for the fetus, even if the decision she makes
is not the one the court, or even society, feels is the right one. 19 Fur-
thermore, it is undoubtedly true, as a general matter, "that most preg-
nant women who eschew cesarean delivery truly believe, based on deeply
held personal or religious convictions, that their decision is the.best one
for themselves and their babies.""12 Interestingly, not only is the woman
being denied the right to make her own decisions, but so is her entire
family. The New England Journal of Medicine study reports that in
twelve cases in which custody of the fetus was sought, either in juvenile
court, probate court, or family court, custody or guardianship was given
to a hospital administrator, hospital attorney, the hospital and the doctor
together, the medical staff, the doctor alone, or a guardian ad litem. In
none of the twelve was custody or guardianship given to a family
member. 121
Rather than subject women to forced cesareans and criminal liabil-
ity for smoking, states should seek to educate women about pregnancy,
make prenatal care and nutrition more widely available, and encourage
the physician-patient relationship. As one commentator has observed,
the cuts in state and federal spending for maternal and child health and
nutrition so pervasive in the United States, coupled with the fact that
many group insurance policies do not provide maternity benefits, make
talk of criminal liability simply cruel. 12 2
terbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). Even though the Johnson policy was
struck down, the implications of such a systematic belittling of women's decisionmaking ca-
pacities and a consequent assumption of life's most critical decisions by the State are extremely
serious and frightening for a society that prides itself on the preservation of liberty and
autonomy.
119. See, e.g., Ronna Jurow & Richard H. Paul, Cesarean Deliveryfor Fetal Distress With-
out Maternal Consent, 63 OB. & GYN. 596, 597 (1984) (noting that woman refused a cesarean
and "stated that if the fetus would die, it would solve her already-complicated life situation").
It also is important to point out that although physicians may feel that they are making the
best decision, they are not always right. New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2,
at 1195 ('The prediction of harm to the fetus was inaccurate in six cases in which court orders
were sought for cesarean sections." (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 86, 90 n.1, 274 S.E.2d 457, 458, 461 n.1 (1981) (placenta
moved despite medical testimony that it was "virtually impossible that this condition will cor-
rect itself prior to delivery").
120. Daniels, supra note 5, at 1068.
121. See New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1193.
122. Gallagher, supra note 17, at 56-57 n.242.
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The second underlying issue concerns the status and background of
women who are subject to forced cesareans. The New England Journal
of Medicine study found that seventeen of twenty-one orders sought to
authorize intervention (including cesarean sections, intrauterine transfu-
sions, and hospital detention) involved African-American, Asian, or His-
panic women.123 For five of the twenty-one English was not their
primary language. 24 Finally, all twenty women for whom information
was available were either patients at a teaching hospital or public assist-
ance recipients. 125 Maternal competence was established in three cases,
and not considered in the others.1 26 The unfortunate conclusion from
this data is that the women who are least able to get good prenatal care
or nutrition during pregnancy, and for whom much needs to be done to
encourage an ongoing relationship with a health care provider, are most
likely to undergo a forced cesarean section. 27 Furthermore, these wo-
men are probably quite different from their physicians, both in back-
ground and socio-economic status. It is not clear whether these women
are being given proper care or if they are falling prey to, at best, lack of
good communication between physician and patient, or, at worst,
discrimination. 128
Finally, serious consideration must be given to the broader question
of what role medical technology should play in our society. As more life-
expanding techniques are developed, a stronger ethical framework is nec-
essary to guide their application. It is important to remember that there
123. New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1193.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Interestingly, the population of women who have cesarean sections in general is
highly heterogenous. Those who undergo this type of surgery can be found across the spec-
trum in terms of education, income, age, number of pregnancies, insurance, and prenatal care.
Daniels, supra note 5, at 1065. The wide distribution raises other issues about the need for
cesarean sections for those women at the highest levels of income and insurance. Presumably,
if income were related to the likelihood a woman would need a cesarean, those women with the
most prenatal care, highest income, and possibly highest nutrition level would need the fewest
cesareans. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Id.
127. For discussions of the disparities in health care provision between whites and people
of color, see HEALTHCARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA 99 (Woodrow Jones & Mitchell F.
Rice eds. 1987) ("It is well documented that black Americans as a group have been and con-
tinue to be recipients of what has been called 'second class medicine.' "); 1 MARGARET M.
HECKLER, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-2 (1985) (compiling statistics of discrepancies in health and health
care).
128. In response to a suggestion that women refuse cesareans for "'occult'" reasons, one
commentator asked whether a doctor can always be sure he has dealt with other possible
explanations, such as "fear, prejudice, ignorance, difficulty with language, and inadequate rap-
port between doctor and patient." Shriner, supra note 118, at 519.
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are limits to medical knowledge and medical certainty. 12 9 Society puts
tremendous pressures on physicians and expects certainty in diagnosis
and treatment, a certainty that is often, at least at present, impossible.
This is especially true in the area of fetal technology. For example, elec-
tronic fetal monitoring (EFM), used to check for fetal distress, has been
shown to have a false positive13 rate of between 18.5% and 80%." 3'
Blood scalp sampling, a follow-up technique used to confirm fetal dis-
tress, has a false positive rate of 44% when combined with EFM.1 32 Fur-
thermore, blood scalp sampling is difficult to perform, both because of
the way the test is done and because the fetus must be in a certain posi-
tion for the test to be attempted. 3 3 Simply because a test has a false
positive rate does not make it useless. A test with a substantial false
positive rate, however, is not a valid basis for ordering nonconsensual
surgery.
Despite the uncertainty behind any diagnosis, at times courts have
been willing to rely unquestioningly on medical assessments. In In re
Madyun,134 the court overrode the refusal of surgery by a nineteen-year-
old woman whose decision was supported by her husband. The physi-
cian felt that a cesarean was necessary not because there were specific
indications of problems but because labor had gone on for almost sixty
hours, and the potential for problems was increasing. 135 The couple re-
fused both on religious grounds and because, there being no problems
yet, neither thought the surgery was necessary. In addition, the husband
felt that the hospital had not given sufficient time to allow for a vaginal
129. New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1195.
130. A false positive is a positive result when in fact the condition being tested for is not
present. 2 J. E. SCHMIDT, ATToRNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE F-17 (1991).
131. Daniels, supra note 5, at 1070; Rhoden, supra note 5, at 2014. Moreover, these tests
are difficult to interpret. One study of 12 practitioners who interpreted identical patterns
found that no two used the same criteria for evaluation and that only 69% of the time would
any two agree on whether to continue monitoring or perform a cesarean. Id. at 2016.
132. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 2015. Blood scalp sampling is a procedure by which a plastic
cone is inserted through the vagina to puncture the skin of the fetal head and draw a blood
sample. Albert Haverkamp & Miriam Orleans, An Assessment of Electronic Fetal Monitoring,
WOMEN & HEALTH, Fall/Vinter 1982, at 115, 119 (1982). The procedure is difficult to per-
form and is uncomfortable for the woman. Id.; Barry Schifrin, The Fetal Monitoring Polemic,
9 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 399, 406 (1982) (positing that the procedure is rarely done
outside of academic circles because it is so difficult and because it is perceived as being of little
assistance to the physician).
133. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 2016 n.327.
134. Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. July 26, 1986), reprinted in In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1260-
63 (D.C. 1990) (en banc). Madyun is an excellent example of the time pressures that can come
into play in deciding these cases. Judge Levie, who decided Madyun, filed the decision at 1:05
a.m. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1264. Two other judges affirmed it at 2:08 a.m. Id.
135. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1260-61.
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birth and was not helping further delivery by, for example, letting his
wife get up and walk around. 13 6 The court authorized the forced sur-
gery: "Neither parent, however, is a trained physician. To ignore the
undisputed opinion of a skilled and trained physician to indulge the
desires of the parents, where, as here, there is a substantial risk to the
unborn infant, is something the Court cannot do." 137 Of course, it is
something the court can do; but rather than engage in any balancing test,
the court instead merely authorized what the doctors requested.
The forced cesarean situation is one in which medical judgment can-
not be questioned through the usual challenges of expert opinion. 138
There may be no time for the woman to go out and get a second opinion,
or she may not know the hospital is planning to seek a court order.1 39 As
a result, the only medical testimony at the hearing may be that of the
doctor seeking the order.14° What may appear to be uncontrovertable
may therefore be merely uncontroverted at the time. On a broader level,
it is dangerous to say that what can be done, must be done.
What, then, should a court do when confronted with a petition for
an order authorizing a hospital to perform surgery over a woman's re-
fusal? It is not appropriate for the court to refuse to decide whether the
woman's decision not to have surgery should be respected. Such peti-
tions present serious questions involving rights and responsibilities. A
court cannot refuse to hear these issues simply because they are difficult
ones.141 The refusal of a pregnant woman to undergo recommended
treatment is "[a]mong the most harrowing experiences for obstetri-
cians." 42  The doctor quite likely will want to go ahead with the sur-
gery. The New England Journal of Medicine study revealed that at least
the doctors surveyed were quite aggressive in their attitudes about sur-
gery. Twenty- six of fifty-seven (forty-six percent) agreed that "mothers
who refused medical advice and thereby endangered the life of the fetus
should be detained in hospitals or other facilities so that compliance
could be ensured."14 Twenty-seven of fifty-seven (forty-seven percent)
felt that "precedent set by the courts in cases requiring emergency
cesarean sections for the sake of the fetus should be extended to include
136. Id. at 1260.
137. Id. at 1263.
138. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
139. See supra text accompanying note 107.
140. For example, this was the case inA.C., in which medical records were missing and one
of A.C.'s long-term physicians who would have opposed the cesarean was not notified of the
hearing. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1248 & n.17.
141. See Rhoden, supra note 5, at 2008-10.
142. New England Journal of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1194.
143. Id. at 1193.
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other procedures that are potentially lifesaving for the fetus, such as in-
trauterine transfusion, as these procedures come to represent the stan-
dard of care."'" Fifteen of fifty-eight (twenty-six percent) "advocated
state surveillance of women in the third trimester who stay outside the
hospital system.""'
Furthermore, the risk-benefit analysis for the physician seems to
favor intervention. It seems more likely that the outcome will be positive
if the surgery is performed; people with positive outcomes do not sue. If
no intervention occurs and there is a negative outcome, however, the par-
ents might sue.'" Nor is it unreasonable for obstetricians to be con-
cerned about medical liability. The role of the court is not only to make
it clear that there cannot be a suit for damages against a physician who
abides by the decision of a competent patient, 147 but to uphold that right
to consent or refuse by hearing the cases and denying requests for orders.
The approach suggested by the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals in In re A. C. " seems a logical one. Most critical is the assessment
of whether the patient is competent to make a decision. 49 Once a patient
is found competent, her decision should control. If, however, she is not
competent, the court should engage in either a best-interests or substi-
tuted-judgment analysis.' 50 Forced surgery should be allowed only in
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1193-94. The survey also included questions about home birth: 22% felt home
birth should be illegal because it poses an "inherent increase in risk"; 33% felt that it should be
legal, despite this inherent risk; 37% felt that "competent adults, including pregnant women
with viable fetuses, were autonomous and might refuse medical care, and therefore, home birth
should be legal." Id. at 1194. The study points out that seven of the 20 who felt competent
pregnant women should be able to refuse medical care had, in response to earlier questions,
supported court-ordered interventions such as hospital detentions, intrauterine transfusions,
and state surveillance. This left only 24% who supported a woman's right to consent or refuse
treatment throughout the entire questionnaire. Id.
146. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 2009.
147. A physician is under no liability if she acts in accordance with the wishes of a compe-
tent patient. In the New England Journal of Medicine study, none of the respondents knew of
any case in which a physician was sued for failing to get a court order. New England Journal
of Medicine Study, supra note 2, at 1196. The authors point out, however, that if physicians
insist on practicing in such an aggressive manner, they may change the standard of care. Id.
Of course, a physician who is in any way concerned about the competency of a patient should
have her evaluated. See supra note 26.
148. 573 A.2d. 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc). For a discussion of A.C., see supra notes 70-92
and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 26 for discussion of competency evaluations.
150. A substituted-jidgment analysis focuses on what the particular patient would decide
to do if competent. A best-interests analysis, on the other hand, focuses solely on what is in
the best interests of the patient herself. Because it is doubtful whether any court confronted
with an incompetent woman would refuse to order the surgery, regardless of the test it applies,
these tests are not treated separately. The tests can, however, lead to different results. See
supra note 53.
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truly extraordinary circumstances.
There are other proposals. One, proposed by Alice Noble-Allgire,
would require the court to consider four factors.151 First, the court
should consider whether the state has a compelling interest. Noble-
Allgire argues that after viability, the state does have a compelling inter-
est in protecting fetal life. Moreover, the treatment must prevent "seri-
ous, irreversible harm to the fetus"; the benefit to the fetus must be great,
and the level of certainty in this outcome high.1 52 Second, there must be
no less intrusive means available of achieving the State's interests.15 3
Third, the court should consider whether the treatment will impose any
additional harm on the woman. 54 She acknowledges that under the no
trade-off rule of Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 1 55 a judge may not issue a court order. She advocates, how-
ever, a general balancing test in which the risks associated with a usual
cesarean section would not count as additional risks.15 6 Finally, if there
is uncertainty, "[b]ecause of the serious nature of the intrusion, it seems
only fair to tip the balance in favor of the mother when all other consid-
erations are equal."1 57
Noble-Allgire applies her test to two familiar situations, namely,
those described in the Jefferson and A. C. cases. In Jefferson, which she
calls "an easy case," she would allow the order because of the potential
benefit to the mother and the fact that without the surgery the fetus was
predicted to die.1 8 In A. C. she would not allow the court order: there
was no benefit to the mother, but rather a serious risk; the chances for
the fetus were not as good; and finally, in close questions the woman's
wishes should control.1 59
Noble-Allgire's proposal is inadequate, not only because it is far
from clear that the State does indeed have an interest in fetal life after
viability sufficient to override the woman's refusal to consent, 160 but also
because it does not afford sufficient respect to the woman, the proper
proxy decisionmaker. Noble-Allgire places tremendous trust in the doc-
tor's ability to be certain, and in the judge's ability to evaluate the medi-
151. Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 244-48.
152. Id. at 244-45.
153. Id. at 245.
154. Id.
155. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). For a discussion of Thornburgh, see supra text accompanying
notes 63-65.
156. Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 246.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 247.
159. Id. at 247-48.
160. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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cal testimony critically.16' She includes no provisions to balance
procedural shortcomings such as the lack of second opinions or the lack
of time for reflection or preparation.
That a court should not be willing to issue a court order authorizing
a forced cesarean does not mean that a physician cannot discuss the med-
ical situation with his patient, the risks to the fetus caused by her refusal,
or the risks to her own health. That kind of careful and intimate discus-
sion between physician and patient should be encouraged. The physician
cannot bully his patient, but he certainly can appeal to the woman in her
role as proxy decisionmaker. Most women do take their physician's ad-
vice.' 62 When there is a disagreement, however, it is simply destructive
to encourage physicians to go to court to override their patients' wishes.
Overriding the woman's decision assaults her right to bodily integrity.
Perhaps more important, it furthers a dangerous recent trend that views
the woman as the enemy of the fetus. This trend is not healthy for soci-
ety, for women, or for babies. It is popular these days to cure perceived
social ills through tougher criminal sanctions, but this is not the right
approach to maternal and child health.'63 This approach degrades wo-
men, both as human beings and as decisionmakers. It also sets up an
adversarial relationship between physician and patient that impedes phy-
sician-patient trust and discourages improved prenatal care and nutri-
tion. If improving pregnancy outcome is really important, then
subjecting women to forced surgery is hardly the best way to achieve that
goal.
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161. See Noble-Allgire, supra note 26, at 245.
162. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1959.
163. Which is not to say, of course, that criminalizing pregnancy-related conduct has not
been suggested by other authors. See, eg., Robertson, supra note 113, at 442-49; Shriner,
supra note 118, at 518-19 (arguing that it would not be the best approach to inform a woman
who refuses a cesarean that she is committing a felony).
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